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INTRODUCTION1
Global economic integration has increased 
dramatically in recent years. The current 
wave of globalization has been characterized 
by two interrelated processes: a sharp drop 
in barriers to trade and the expansion of 
global production networks built around 
multinational corporations (MNCs), which 
are the central actors in the global trading 
system. U.S. MNCs, for instance, account 
for over 80 percent of the value of goods 
and services traded across national borders. 
The formation of these production networks 
is made possible by lowering tariffs and 
other restrictions on the flow of goods and 
services. Efforts at liberalizing international 
trade have been supported by international 
cooperation and have been institutionalized 
in multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade 
agreements. Most countries in the world are 
members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the quintessential multinational 
institution designed around the principles of 
nondiscrimination and reciprocity. 
 The formation of the WTO was the 
result of the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, which was 
concluded in 1994. The lengthy deadlock 
of the Doha Round of the multilateral 
trade regime, which was launched after 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, has 
motivated numerous countries to liberalize 
trade by joining bilateral or regional 
trade agreements, which are known as 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
because they provide preferential market 
access to the signatories. To date, there are 
more than 600 trade agreements in force, 
and every WTO member country is also a 
signatory of (at least) one preferential trade 
agreement.2 Despite their prevalence, the 
effects of PTAs on everything from trade, to 
foreign investment, to economic reform, to 
wages, to employment are hotly debated. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Preferential tariff cuts and other provisions 
included in PTAs promote deeper economic 
integration. PTAs have contributed to 
the formation of regional and global 
production networks, where inputs can 
be shipped across borders multiple times 
to take advantage of lower production 
costs, availability of local resources, and 
economies of scale. The costs of integrating 
production between parent companies and 
their affiliates across national borders—as 
in the case of the Mexican maquiladoras—
would be prohibitive due to the presence 
of higher tariffs and other trade costs. For 
this reason, many countries, including the 
United States and its regional partners, 
have negotiated lower tariffs with their 
preferential trading partners. 
To date, there are 
more than 600 trade 
agreements in force, 
and every WTO member 
country is also a 
signatory of (at least) 
one preferential trade 
agreement.
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more extreme values. The figure suggests 
that there is a large degree of variance in 
the level of cuts within each PTA.  According 
to the U.S. Census Bureau, 79 percent of 
U.S. trade with Latin American countries is 
covered by a PTA (that number increases to 
88 percent if Canada is included).4
POLITICAL BACKLASH AGAINST PTAs
Trade agreements between the United 
States and Latin American countries such 
as the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-
DR), and the now-defunct Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) were a source of heated 
controversy in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
campaign. These agreements were alleged 
to deliver lopsided benefits in favor of U.S. 
trading partners, displacing American blue-
collar workers from their jobs. 
 PTAs are increasingly complex 
arrangements that cover a host of issues, 
including intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
and investor dispute settlement. Once the 
main advocate for multilateral liberalization, 
the U.S. has preferential trade agreements 
in force with 20 countries. Table 1 presents a 
list of the PTAs that the U.S. has signed with 
other nations, and their main provisions.3 
 Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of 
preferential tariff cuts offered by the United 
States in all PTAs it has signed since 1990. 
Latin American nations figure prominently 
in this selective list of U.S. preferential 
trading partners: Mexico (NAFTA, 1994); Chile 
(2004); Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua (CAFTA-DR, 2005); Peru (2009); 
Colombia (2012); and Panama (2012). Figure 
1 shows the distribution of preferential tariff 
cuts for each trading partner under a PTA: 
the shaded boxes mark the interquartile 
range and the median of the distributions 
of tariff cuts, and the hollow circles mark 
We find strong evidence 
that tariff reductions 
offered by the U.S. to 
its preferential trading 
partners has led to the 
reallocation of sales 
from the smallest to the 
largest multinational 
corporations.
NOTES  “Yes” means that a specific section regulating each trade-related issue is included in the treaty. Depth is the level of liberalization envisaged in the trade 
agreement. Enforcement measures the strength of the dispute settlement mechanism embedded in the trade agreement. Depth is built using a latent trait 
analysis of 48 dummy variables associated with trade-related issues (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). Data on enforcement come from Todd Allee and Manfred 
Elsig, “Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements,” Review of 
International Organizations 11, no. 1 (2016): 89-120.
TABLE 1 — DESIGN OF U.S. PTAs
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 The argument is politically expedient, 
particularly in battleground states battered 
by the decline of American manufacturing 
employment.5 But the debate overlooks the 
direct effect of PTAs on the activities of MNCs. 
It is therefore very important to understand 
which firms benefit from PTAs and why. We 
expect MNCs to be the big winners from the 
wave of preferential agreements, but there is 
reason to believe that those benefits will be 
unevenly distributed. 
 In a recent paper published in 
International Organization, we examine the 
impact of preferential liberalization on the 
activities of MNCs.6 Our results are drawn 
from analyzing firm-level data regarding 
the activities of nearly all multinational 
companies based in the U.S., and highly 
disaggregated tariff schedules offered on 
preferential and nonpreferential terms. We 
find strong evidence that tariff reductions 
offered by the U.S. to its preferential trading 
partners has led to a significant expansion 
of the global supply chain activities of the 
largest and most productive firms. Smaller 
and less productive firms, on the other hand, 
are squeezed out of the market following 
preferential liberalization, as firms operating 
in the liberalizing market are forced to lower 
their prices to remain competitive. The 
expansion of the most productive firms, 
in turn, results in higher real wages and 
production costs.7 The net result of this 
reallocation of sales from the smallest to the 
largest MNCs is higher market concentration 
in sectors with higher tariff cuts. 
 To understand these results, we need 
to focus on the role of firms in the global 
economy, particularly the prominent place 
occupied by MNCs. As central actors in the 
international economy, MNCs engage in two 
types of foreign investment: horizontal and 
vertical.8 Horizontal investment seeks to 
reach customers in host markets. Vertical 
investment, central to global supply chain 
production, occurs when MNCs seek 
resources abroad by setting up affiliates  
to produce intermediate or final goods. 
These intermediate and final goods, in 
turn, are then exported back to the home 
market or to third countries, either for 
consumption or for further processing.  
 
We contend that preferential liberalizations 
should promote export-oriented sales by 
lowering trade costs. 
 Yet based on our analysis, it seems that 
not all MNCs gain from lower preferential 
tariffs—only the largest and most productive 
firms do. These findings are in line with recent 
contributions in the field of international 
economics that identify differences in firms’ 
productivity as central determinants of trade 
performance. International expansion through 
exports and investment abroad demands 
extra costs that only the most productive 
firms can afford.9 Lower costs resulting from 
trade liberalization should thus benefit the 
largest and most productive MNCs.  
 Our estimates show that sales from 
affiliates operating abroad back to the United 
States increase for larger firms and decrease 
for smaller firms following preferential tariff 
cuts implemented by the United States. 
SOURCE  Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth (2017), p. 378 
NOTES  The figure displays the distribution of proportional tariff cuts (MFN-PRF)/MFN—namely, the 
difference between the tariff offered to all countries on most favored nation terms (MFN) and the 
preferential tariff resulting from the PTA (PRF) implemented by the U.S. for the 17 PTAs signed after 
1990. Higher proportional cuts reflect a greater difference between the prevailing tariff rate and the 
PTA rate. Data come from World Integrated Trade Solution (2014) and are at a highly disaggregated 
tariff line. Each tariff line corresponds to a specific group of products; the digit level reflects the level 
of detail of the products included in the category, depending on their characteristics. The HS 6-digit 
level follows the international standard known as the Harmonized System.
FIGURE 1 — TARIFF REDUCTIONS IN U.S. PTAs SINCE 1990
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Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a tariff cut 
along the range of affiliate sizes estimated 
in our paper.10 U.S. tariff cuts reduce the 
vertical sales of smaller affiliates. The effect 
of preferential cuts on sales turns positive 
and statistically significant for companies 
with around 45 employees (corresponding 
to 3.5 on the horizontal axis), where we 
estimate that a 10 percent tariff cut is 
associated with a 6 percent increase in 
sales to the United States.
 We also find that preferential tariff 
cuts are associated with increased 
market concentration; the main results 
on concentration derived from our paper 
are reproduced in Figure 3. The figure 
reproduces the estimated effects of PTAs 
on sales concentration, which is measured 
using a Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) Index 
of concentration of affiliate sales.11 To 
illustrate our findings, we selected the 
estimated coefficients from three variables 
that measure the impact of three different 
international institutions on concentration: 
whether the partner country is a member 
of WTO, and hence eligible for access 
to the U.S. under most favored nation 
tariffs; whether the partner country has 
a bilateral investment treaty with the 
U.S.; or whether the partner country has 
a PTA in effect with the U.S., and hence 
is eligible for preferential tariffs. The 
figure shows results from two models in 
our paper: in Model 1 we used a measure 
of the existence of a PTA, and Model 4 
estimated preferential cuts across different 
sectors of the PTA. The dots reproduce the 
estimated coefficients, and the lines mark 
the 95 percent confidence intervals around 
those estimates. The magnitude of these 
effects is sizable: a 10 percent reduction 
in preferential tariffs is associated with 
a 0.5-point increase in the HH Index. In 
sum, the results of our analysis of the 
sales concentration among U.S. MNCs are 
consistent with our conjecture that tariff 
cuts principally benefit the largest firms. 
SOURCE  Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth (2017), p. 386
SOURCE  Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth (2017), p. 391
FIGURE 2 — U.S. PREFERENTIAL TARIFF CUTS AND VERTICAL SALES 
BY FIRM SIZE
FIGURE 3 — INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONCENTRATION  
OF AFFILIATE SALES
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COROLLARY
To sum up, while academic and popular 
debates tend to focus on differential benefits 
and costs of trade across countries or 
industries, our research highlights winners 
and losers at the level of individual firms. In 
short, preferential liberalization produces 
concentrated benefits among a relatively 
small number of very large and productive 
firms. While specific provisions built into 
preferential trade agreements—such as 
setting regulatory standards and protecting 
investment and intellectual property rights—
can produce widespread benefits, cutting 
tariffs on preferential terms has stark 
distributional consequences across firms of 
different sizes and levels of productivity. 
 The linkages between trade, MNC 
expansion and concentration, and income 
inequality is an exciting area for future 
academic research. However, from these 
results we can draw important lessons 
on the future of economic and political 
relations between the U.S., Mexico, and 
other Latin American countries. Our 
findings help explain the sharp political 
backlash against NAFTA, CAFTA, and other 
preferential trade agreements among U.S. 
voters, interest groups, and firms. We can 
predict stronger support for NAFTA from 
the largest and most productive U.S. firms 
engaged in global production in Mexico (and 
Canada), as they reap the lion’s share of 
the benefits of lowering barriers to trade. 
In contrast, smaller and less productive 
firms in the U.S.—particularly those facing 
higher competition from abroad—tend to 
oppose the agreement. Moreover, insofar 
as the wages of workers employed in firms 
benefiting from preferential liberalization 
increase more than the wages of workers 
employed in firms negatively impacted by 
it, trade agreements may contribute to 
income disparity in the U.S. This disparate 
distribution of the costs and benefits of 
regional trade has taken central stage in 
political discourse in the United States; thus, 
the evolution of hemispheric cooperation 
depends on the ability of negotiators to 
address these salient conflicts.
Preferential 
liberalization produces 
concentrated benefits 
among a relatively small 
number of very large 
and productive firms.
Our findings help 
explain the sharp 
political backlash 
against NAFTA, CAFTA, 
and other preferential 
trade agreements 
among U.S. voters, 
interest groups,  
and firms. 
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